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Heterogeneous Convergence 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We use US county-level data containing 3,058 cross-sectional observations and 41 
conditioning variables to study economic growth and explore possible heterogeneity in 
growth determination across 32 individual states.  Using a 3SLS-IV estimation method, 
we find that the convergence rates for 32 individual states are above 2 percent, with an 
average of 8.1 percent.  For 7 states the convergence rate can be rejected as identical to at 
least one other state’s convergence rate with 95 percent confidence.  Convergence rates 
are negatively correlated with initial income.  The size of government at all levels of 
decentralization is either unproductive or negatively correlated with growth.  Educational 
attainment has a non-linear relationship with growth.  The size of the finance, insurance 
and real estate, and entertainment industries are positively correlated with growth, while 
the size of the education industry is negatively correlated with growth.  Heterogeneity in 
the effects of balanced growth path determinants across individual states is harder to 
detect  than in convergence rates. 
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1.  Introduction 
Empirical studies of conditional convergence implicitly assume that all economies 
have identically-structured growth processes and, therefore, it is meaningful to estimate a 
single rate of convergence for them.  See, for example, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 
1992), Mankiw et al (1992), Islam (1995), and Caselli et al (1996).  However, Evans 
(1998) and Brock and Durlauf (2001) emphasize that this assumption is not plausible for 
most data sets because as "countries surely have different technologies, preferences, 
institutions, market structures, government policies, etc" (Evans, 1998, p. 296).  These 
can represent important structural differences.1 
  We use data from 3,058 US counties to study heterogeneity in the structure of 
growth processes and in convergence rates.  The data include per capita income and 41 
conditioning variables. We estimate parameters for the entire US and for 32 individual 
states as economies in and of themselves.2  The large data set allows us to identify state-
specific convergence and balanced growth path parameters.  State-by-state analysis 
admits heterogeneity in (a) convergence rates, (b) balanced growth paths, and (c) 
balanced growth rates (the rate of technical progress).  In this paper, we explore the 
heterogeneity of the within-state growth processes along dimensions (a) and (b). 
Heterogeneity in growth processes has been the focus of some recent studies.  
Durlauf and Johnson (1995) use data for 121 countries and reject the single linear growth 
model.  Lee, Pesaran and Smith (1997) show that deriving a growth equation from an 
explicitly stochastic Solow model reveals heterogeneity of balanced growth rates as a 
                                                 
1
 Levy and Dezhbakhsh (2003) provide international evidence on output fluctuation and shock persistence that may be 
considered an indirect evidence of such heterogeneity. 
2
 The remaining states do not have enough counties for growth equations to be identified. 
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source of bias in convergence rate estimates. Rappaport (2000) estimates a model with a 
flexible functional form to capture variation in convergence rates.  Durlauf, Kourtellos, 
and Minkin (2001) allow for cross-country variation in production function parameters.3 
The existing studies represent a range of ingenious techniques designed to cope 
with a limited number of observations typically available.  The above studies, for 
example, depart from the convergence literature by innovating primarily along the lines 
of econometric specification.  The present paper uses new data as its primary innovation. 
Given our unusually large data set covering the entire US, we are able to explore 
heterogeneity in convergence rates across the US and amongst the majority of its states 
without the need of any special econometric method for capturing the heterogeneity.  
Besides the large number of observations and conditioning variables, our county 
data offer several advantages.  A single institution collects the data, ensuring uniformity 
of variable definitions.  There is no exchange rate variation between the counties and the 
price variation across counties is smaller than across countries, reducing the potential 
errors-in-variables bias (Bliss, 1999).4  Importantly, counties within a given state form a 
sample with geographical homogeneity and a shared state government.  To a great extent 
the states are ready-made “clubs” within which we would expect convergence.  The large 
data set allows us to study inter-state heterogeneity, while the intra-state homogeneity 
gives as much assurance of a correct specification as can realistically be hoped for.  
Lastly of note is the relative homogeneity of US counties as a whole.  If we find 
                                                 
3
 Heterogeneous growth has also been the focus of the “club convergence” literature (Quah, 1996, 1997).  Desdoigts 
(1999) uses the method of exploratory projection pursuit to determine which variables cause clustering of economies 
into clubs, and finds that, “…institutional, cultural, and geographical clubs… form endogenously on the basis of their 
economic structure” (p. 323).  Using a Bayesian analysis, Canova (2004) finds that initial conditions lead to clubs.  
4
 These virtues are also embodied in state-level data used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991) and Evans (1997a).  State-
level data, however, sacrifices the large number of observations we have.  A full 29 of our states have counties 
numbering more than 50 (the number of US states) each. 
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economically important heterogeneity of growth processes across states, then surely we 
can infer that as much, or (likely) more, heterogeneity exists across countries. 
Following Higgins et al (2006) we use a cross-sectional variant of a 3SLS-IV 
approach first developed by Evans (1997b) for estimating the growth equations.  Evans 
(1997b) and Caselli et al (1996) show that data must satisfy highly implausible conditions 
for OLS estimators to be consistent.  Caselli et al suggest a panel GMM method that 
differences out omitted variable bias and uses instruments to alleviate endogeneity 
concerns.  This method, however, is useful if there are enough time series observations 
after differencing.  In our data, most of the conditioning variables come from the US 
Census and, therefore, are collected only at 10 year intervals.  Our data’s appeal lies in 
the exceptionally large cross-sectional dimension and, therefore, a cross-sectional 
estimation technique appears more appropriate.5   
We find significant heterogeneity in the state-level convergence rates.  Across the 
32 states, 3SLS point estimates range from 3.8 percent (California) to 15.6 percent 
(Louisiana), with an average of 8.1 percent.  The 95 percent confidence intervals 
associated with these estimates are narrow enough so that the heterogeneity cannot be 
merely dismissed on grounds of statistical uncertainty.  We find a statistically significant, 
but small, negative partial correlation between the convergence rate and initial income, 
suggesting that (initially) poorer states are not facing relatively poor convergence 
potentials. We also find that the size of government at all levels of decentralization is 
either unproductive or negatively correlated with growth.  Educational attainment has a 
non-linear relationship with growth.  The size of the finance, insurance and real estate, 
                                                 
5
 Evans (1997a) develops a panel data variant of his method and applies it to US state and international data, obtaining 
convergence rate estimates of 16 and 6 percent, respectively. 
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and the entertainment industries are positively correlated with growth, while the size of 
the education industry is negatively correlated with growth.  Finally, heterogeneity in the 
effects of balanced growth path determinants across US states is harder to detect than in 
convergence rates. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses the model and the 3SLS 
method.  Section 3 describes the data.  Section 4 studies heterogeneity in the convergence 
rates. Section 5 focuses on balanced growth path determinants.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  The Model and 3SLS Estimation Procedure 
 The basic specification used in growth regressions arises from the neoclassical 
growth model.6  The growth model implies that, 
 
(2.1)  )1(ˆ)0(ˆ)(ˆ * BtBt eyeyty −− −+=  
 
where yˆ  is the log of income per effective unit of labor, t denotes the time, and B is a 
nonlinear function of various parameters (preference parameters, population growth rate, 
etc).  B governs the speed of adjustment to the steady state, *yˆ .  From (2.1) it follows that 
the average growth rate of income per unit of labor between dates 0 and T is, 
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6
 A derivation of the baseline specification is provided by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992). 
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where z is the exogenous rate of technical progress and B represents the responsiveness of 
the average growth rate to the gap between the steady state income and the initial value.  
Since effective units of labor (L) are assumed to equal Lezt, we have )0()0(ˆ yy = . 
Growth regressions are obtained by fitting to the cross-sectional data the equation, 
   
(2.3)  nnnn xyg νγβα +′++= 0 .      
 
In (2.3), ng  is the average growth rate of per capita income for economy n between years 
0 and T [i.e., ( ))0()(1 yTy
T
− ], the constant α is a function of z, β  = 

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, nx  is a 
vector of variables that control for cross-economy heterogeneity in determinants of the 
steady-state, γ  is a coefficients' vector, and νn is a zero mean, finite variance error term. 
Caselli et al (1996) and Evans (1997b) show that OLS will be consistent only if 
the data satisfy highly implausible conditions. According to Evans (1997b), unless (i) the 
economies have identical AR(1) representations, (ii) every economy affects every other 
economy symmetrically, (iii) the conditioning variables control for all permanent cross-
economy differences, and (iv) the right hand side variables are exogenous, the OLS 
estimates of the speed of convergence are inconsistent—they are biased downwards.7 
Evans (1997b) proposes a 3SLS-IV method that produces consistent estimates.  In 
the first two stages, instrumental variables are used to estimate the regression equation, 
 
(2.4)  nnn yg ηβω +∆+=∆ 0 ,       
                                                 
7
 These results, derived by Evans (1997b), are included in the referee appendix available upon request. 
  
 
7 
 
where 
T
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=∆ , 1,00 −−=∆ nnn yyy , ny  is the log of per 
capita income for county n, ω and β are parameters, and nη  is the error.8 ,9  As 
instruments we use the lagged (1969) values of all nx  variables except Metro, Per-Capita 
Water Area, and Per-Capita Land Area.10  Given our sample period, we define 
∆gn =
(yn,1998 − yn,1970)
T
−
(yn,1997 − yn,1969)
T
. 
Next, we use *β , the estimate from (2.4), to construct the variable  
 
(2.5)  0* nnn yg βpi −= .        
 
In the third stage, we use the OLS to regress npi  on the vector nx , which consists of the 
potential determinants of the balanced growth path levels. That is, 
 
(2.6)  nnn x εγτpi ++= ,        
 
                                                 
8
 An immediate concern with the use of (2.4) is the reliance on the information from the single difference in the level of 
income (1969 to 1970) to explain the difference in average growth rates over overlapping time periods (1969 to 1997 
and 1970 to 1998).  Given that the growth determination is a stochastic process, the potential problem is basically one 
of a high noise to signal ratio.  We are relying on large degrees of freedom to alleviate this problem and identify the 
convergence rates. Indeed, we obtain statistically significant convergence rate estimates for the full sample as well as 
for all 32 individual states.  
9
 As Evans (1997b) shows, the derivation of this equation depends on the assumption that the xn variables are constant 
during the time frame considered, allowing them to be differenced out.  Since the difference is only over a single year 
and these are variables representing broad demographic trends, this does not seem to be unwarranted.  To make sure 
that this did not introduce significant omitted variable bias into our estimations, we ran the IV regression for the full 
U.S. sample with differenced values of all conditioning variables included as regressors.  The point estimate of β from 
the modified IV fell within the 95 percent confidence interval of the Evans method IV estimate.  If β estimates are not 
significantly affected then neither are the third stage results (see below). 
10
 See the data appendix for details and Table 1 for the list of the conditioning variables. 
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where τ and γ are parameters and εn is the error term.  This regression yields a consistent 
estimator, γ*.11  Also note that in principle τ is the same as the OLS α: it is an estimate of 
the exogenous rate of technical progress, z, or the balanced growth rate. 
 Thus, to briefly summarize the 3SLS procedure we use, in the first two stages, it 
differences out any uncontrolled form of heterogeneity to eliminate omitted variable bias 
and then, in the third stage, it uses the resulting estimate of β to recreate the component of 
the standard growth regression that would be related to conditioning variables.  This 
component is regressed on a constant and the conditioning variables in “un-differenced” 
form to estimate the effects of conditioning variables on balanced growth paths.  This 
procedure is ideal for data with a large number of cross-sectional observations and it also 
ensures that no information contained in the levels of the conditioning variables is lost.12   
Along with the 3SLS results, we also report the OLS results for comparison. We 
use a Hausman test as an additional aid in determining the necessity of the IV approach.  
Two tests are applied to the full US sample.  The first test is run on the β* values and 
yields an m value of 134.6. The second test is run on the entire model and yields an m 
value of 1236.6.  Both tests reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level, suggesting that the 
OLS estimates are indeed inconsistent, and confirming the importance of using the IV 
                                                 
11
 Technically speaking, γ is not the partial effects of xn variables on the heights of the balanced growth paths. Those 
partial effects are functions of β and γ. However, if the neoclassical growth hypothesis is true (β < 0), then signs of 
elements of γ will be the same as those of the partial effects of given xn elements. Assuming that β is identical across 
economies, the size of γ elements relative to one another expresses the magnitude of the partial effects relative to one 
another. Thus, while γ* does not allow for precise quantitative statements about the effects of given variables on 
balanced growth paths, it does allow for statements about the sign of such effects, and how important those effects are 
relative to each other. 
12
 This is a point on which Barro (1997, p. 37) has criticized panel data methods. As they rely on time series 
information, the conditioning variables are differenced.  However, the conditioning variables often vary slowly over 
time such that the most important information is in the levels. Indeed, we have estimated the model using a panel-
GMM method of Caselli, et al. (1996) but the resulting estimates did not make much sense. We believe the main reason 
for the failure of the panel-GMM approach is that it is ill-suited for our data because our sample does not form a “true 
panel”: although we have over 3,000 cross-sectional observations, over time we only have 3 time series observations 
(the 1970, 1980, and 1990 decennial Census data) and it appears that it is not enough to carry the level-information 
forward after the variables are differenced, which is necessary for implementing panel-GMM estimation. 
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method for addressing the potential endogeneity of conditioning variables.13 
We follow Rappaport and Sachs (2003) in accounting for a possible spatial 
correlation between the error-terms of the counties located in proximity with each other. 
We report a generalization of the Huber-White heteroskedastic-consistent estimator based 
on Rappaport’s (1999) implementation of Conley’s (1999) correction to obtain standard 
errors that are robust to such a spatial correlation. 
Rappaport and Sachs (2003) specify a cutoff distance d , and assume that the 
covariance between the errors of two counties is zero, if the Euclidean distance between 
the counties centers exceeds d . Otherwise, they impose declining weight structure on the 
covariance by defining a distance function 2)200/(1)( ijij ddg −= , where ijd  is the 
distance between the centers of counties i and j. It is assumed that ijijji dgE ρεε )()( = , 
where jiij ee=ρˆ , and 1)( =ijdg  for 0=ijd , 0)( =ijdg  for ddij > , and 0)( ≤′ ijdg  for 
ddij ≤ . 
Thus, we assume that the covariance between the error terms drops quadratically 
as the distance between the counties increases to km200=d . These standard errors are 
used in calculating the confidence intervals reported under the CR (Conley-Rappaport) 
column in Tables 2–5. In sum, we present three estimates: OLS, CR-OLS, and 3SLS.14 
 
3. US County-Level Data 
                                                 
13
 Some of the variables we use could be viewed as endogenous. We believe, however, that the problem is not severe 
because in our model, the RHS variables are temporally prior to the regressors. Also, we use IVs to account for the 
endogeneity. Indeed, the Hausman test confirmed the appropriateness of the IV approach. 
14
 The OLS and the CR-OLS point estimates are the same; only the standard errors differ. The actual significance of the 
CR correction appears to vary across the US states. According to the figures in Tables 3–5, the CR standard errors are 
usually lower than the OLS standard errors. But sometimes they are not different than, or are even higher than, the OLS 
standard errors, which is consistent with Conley’s (1999) conclusion that spatial correlation does not necessarily 
increase the standard errors. We note that the CR correction was not implemented within the 3SLS framework because 
the statistical properties of the resulting estimators are not known. 
  
 
10 
Although our data are drawn from several sources, the majority come from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Information System (BEA-REIS) and 
the US Census.  The BEA-REIS data are largely based on the 1970, 1980 and 1990 
decennial Census summary tape files, the 1972, 1977, 1982 and 1987 Census of 
Governments, and the Census Bureau’s City and County Book from various years.  All 
variables are expressed in 1992 dollars.  Military personnel are excluded from the data. 
 Our data include 3,058 county-level observations.  Figure 1 displays the US 
divided into counties.15  We study the full sample as well as 32 individual states.  We use 
the BEA measure of personal income and adjust it to be net of government transfers.16, 17  
Natural logs of the real per capita income are used in the analysis. 
Our data contain 41 conditioning variables.  In Table 1 we provide the list of the 
variables we use along with their definitions, their source, and the period they cover.  All 
41 variables are used for estimation with the full sample.  However, only 34 of them are 
used for the with-in state estimations to preserve degrees of freedom.18 
 
4. Analysis of Convergence Rate Estimates 
Table 2 reports the asymptotic conditional convergence rate estimates along with 
their 95% confidence intervals for all three estimation methods (OLS, CR-OLS, and 
                                                 
15
 The figure excludes Hawaiian and Alaskan counties, which are included in the full sample. 
16
 For details, see “Local Area Personal Income, 1969–1992,” Regional Accounts Data, BEA, Feb. 2, 2001. 
17
 The definitions of the personal income components at the county level are similar to those used for national 
estimates. For example, the BEA defines “personal income” as the sum of wage and salary disbursements, other labor 
income, proprietors’ income (with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments), rental income (with 
capital consumption adjustment), dividend income and interest income. 
18
 Our rule for exclusion is that a conditioning variable, in the third stage regression using the full sample, results in a 
coefficient estimate with zeros to at least the fourth decimal place (0.0000).  The variables excluded from the within-
state regressions are “land area,” “water area,” “education: public elementary,” “education: public nursery,” 
“education: private elementary,” "college town," and “education: private nursery.” 
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3SLS), for the full US sample and for 32 individual US states.19 
For the full sample of 3,058 counties, the 3SLS estimate of the conditional 
convergence rate is 6.58 percent, significant at the 1 percent level.  This is in contrast to 
2.39 percent using OLS (also significant at the 1 percent level).  The difference between 
the two estimates is nearly 300 percent, suggesting that OLS introduces substantial bias.  
The difference is economically large: a 2.39 percent convergence rate implies the gap 
between the present per capita income level and the balanced growth path halves in 31 to 
32 years, while a 6.58 percent rate implies the same in 12 to 13 years. 
The finding of conditional convergence rates above the 2 percent “mnemonic 
rule” of Sala-i-Martin (1996) holds for 32 individual states as well.  Figure 2 presents 
confidence intervals as vertical bars around the point estimates.  The 2-percent rule is 
represented by a horizontal line.  Every point estimate is above 2 percent, and the average 
estimate is 8.1 percent.  For 8 states the point estimate is above 10 percent.  Considering 
the 95 percent confidence intervals, for only 3 states is the lower bound of the interval not 
greater than 2 percent (California, Iowa, and South Dakota all bottom out at 1.8 percent).   
There is considerable heterogeneity in the estimated convergence rates.  Indeed, 
Figure 2 suggests that confidence intervals do not overlap enough to dismiss 
heterogeneity.  The pair wise absences of overlap in confidence intervals can be 
interpreted as statistical rejection of convergence rate homogeneity at the 95 percent level 
for given pairs of states.  We can consider a given state and ask for how many other states 
can its convergence rate be rejected as identical.  For 7 states there is at least one other 
                                                 
19
 Following Higgins et al (2006), we use Evans' (1997b, p. 16) expression, c = 1 – (1 + Tβ)1/T to infer the asymptotic 
convergence rates from the estimates of β.  The confidence intervals are obtained by computing the endpoints, β ± 
1.96×s.e.(β), and plugging them into c = 1 – (1 + Tβ)1/T.  (See the note underneath Table 2 for more details.) The 
estimates of β, the coefficient on the log of 1970 real per capita income, are not reported for brevity. 
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state for which their two convergence rates can be rejected as identical.   
The full picture that one gets from Table 2 and Figure 2 is of a group of 
economies with high rates of convergence, but significant heterogeneity above that mark.  
This heterogeneity should not be surprising.  The convergence rate in the neoclassical 
growth model is a function of the rates of technology and population growth, the 
depreciation rate, as well as the parameters of the aggregate technology and preferences.  
So differences in what particular industries predominate in an economy, cultural 
characteristics, and institutions can all translate into different convergence rates.   
Encouraging is the fact that running a simple univariate OLS regression of the 
state 3SLS convergence rate point estimates on (log) initial real 1970 income yields a 
partial correlation of  –0.0802, significant at the 5 percent level.  This is not a large 
elasticity.20  However, it does suggest that (initially) poorer economies are not in general 
facing relatively poor convergence potentials as well. 
 
5. Analysis of Balanced Growth Path Determinants 
Just as there may be heterogeneity in the rates of convergence towards balanced 
growth paths, there may also be heterogeneity in the height of the balanced growth path 
and/or the slope of the path (the balanced growth rate).  Below we focus on several 
conditioning variables.  In our regressions, their coefficients indicate their effects on the 
average growth rate of per capita income indirectly via the height of the balanced growth 
paths.  Given that height, the average growth rate increases (if higher) or decreases (if 
lower) as a result of the distance of per capita income from the balanced growth path and 
                                                 
20
 The standard deviation of (log) initial real 1970 income is 0.1656, associated with a –1.330 percent change in a 
convergence rate, while the standard deviation of the state convergence rate point estimates is 3.230 percent. 
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the convergence effect towards that path.21  
The variables we focus on are grouped into public sector size variables, 
educational attainment variables, and industry composition variables.  In each case we 
focus on 3SLS estimates.  We discuss the results for the entire sample, and to address 
potential cross-state heterogeneity, for individual states as well. 
 
i. Size of the Public Sector 
Does government foster or hinder economic growth?  A large literature explores 
this question in a cross-section of countries.22  These studies use government expenditure 
variables to capture the size and scope of government.  We, in contrast, use the percent of 
a county’s population employed by the federal, state and local governments, which offer 
certain advantages over expenditure variables.  First, the three separate measures allow us 
to explore how the link between the public sector and growth varies at three levels of 
decentralization.  Second, the separate measures can help to alleviate problems of 
interpreting coefficients when externalities exist.  For example, the local government 
variable should be nearly immune to spill-over effects.   
Our employment variables complement the expenditure variables used in previous 
studies because employment variables can be interpreted as a stock of government 
activities producing a flow of services, while government expenditures are the flow of 
services.  While previous studies directly account for government expenditure, our 
                                                 
21
 If conditional convergence were to be rejected, then these coefficients would be interpreted as influences on 
economies’ balanced growth rates.  However, since we report results only for states where 3SLS convergence rates 
were statistically significant, conditioning variable coefficient estimates can be interpreted as effects on the height of 
balanced growth paths throughout this paper.   
22
 Barro (1991) and Folster and Henrekson (2001) find that a large public sector is growth hindering.  Easterly and 
Rebelo (1993) find that public investments in transportation and communication accelerate economic growth, but that 
links between growth and other fiscal variables are fragile.  Evans and Karras (1994) report that government activities, 
except education services, are either unproductive or affect growth negatively in a cross-section of the U.S states. 
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employment variables directly account for the extent to which government is involved in 
the economy, i.e. the percent of labor force activities directed by government.23 Also, 
whereas expenditure measures can provide useful differentiation of roles of government, 
our variables provide another differentiation of roles, those associated with federal 
government versus those of state and local governments.   
Table 3 summarizes the results.  In the full sample, we find a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the percent of the population employed by 
government and the growth rate.  Furthermore, the negative effect does not diminishing 
at more decentralized levels. The coefficients for the federal, state and local variables are 
–0.0226, –0.0163, and –0.0204 respectively (all significant at the 1 percent level).24 
Considering the individual states, we see that in vast majority of the cases, there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the three government employment 
variables and growth.  Federal government employment coefficient is statistically 
significant in four states, the state government in five states, and the local government in 
six states. Of these 15 statistically significant coefficient estimates, 11 are negative and 
four positive.  The positive coefficients are obtained in North Dakota (for all three 
government employment variables) and in Kansas (for the local government variable). 
For all three variables we find some heterogeneity.  Focusing on cases with 
negative coefficients, the statistically significant federal, state, and local government 
estimates range from –0.0917 (Missouri) to –0.1368 (Idaho), from –0.0422 (North 
                                                 
23
 Obviously, expenditure and involvement are not mutually exclusive.  Government expends wages so that labor is 
involved in government activities.  As well, government expenditures are part of market demand and, therefore, 
influence the allocation of resources in the private sector. 
24
 Besides the public sector hindering economic growth via distortions of incentives and diversion of resources, another 
possibility is that non-government wage growth simply outpaces government wage growth.  We looked at wage data 
for the 1970-1998 period.  At the state and federal level, government wage growth outpaced non-government wage 
growth in approximately 45 percent of counties.  At the local level, government wages grew faster in over 70 percent of 
counties.  These differences do not appear strong enough to drive the federal and state estimates, and would work 
against the local estimates.   
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Carolina) to –0.0729 (Colorado), and from –0.0431 (Minnesota) to –0.1792 (Louisiana), 
respectively.   
In sum, we find a negative relationship between the size of government and the 
rate of economic growth when we consider the entire US.  For 30 of the 32 individual 
states analyzed here, government at all levels of decentralization has either no 
statistically-discernable effects or negative effects, which is similar to the findings 
reported by Evans and Karras (1994).  As such, discernable differences between “good” 
versus “bad” governments across states cannot be detected  (the possible exception being 
North Dakota with its positive and significant coefficients for each level of government 
employment).25  
 
ii. Educational Attainment 
Our data include 8 measures of educational attainments.  We focus on four: the 
percent of the population with (a) 9 to11 years of education, (b) high school diploma, (c) 
some college education, and (d) bachelor degree or more.26  Table 4 reports the 3SLS 
coefficient estimates for these variables.  
Consider the percent of the population with at least 9 years of education, but less 
than a high school degree.  For the full sample the coefficient is –0.0204, significant at 
the 1 percent level.  This seems sensible, implying that the greater percentage of 
population without the skills necessary to obtain a high school diploma, the lower the 
balanced growth path.  Passing that threshold, the coefficient for the population achieving 
                                                 
25
 Levine and Renelt (1992) show that cross-country regression results are sensitive to small changes in the set of 
conditioning variables.  The 3SLS method yields consistent estimators for conditioning variable coefficients regardless 
of the specific set included.  Also, the large set of conditioning variables we use should minimize omitted variable bias.  
26
 Although two of the remaining four variables (public and private elementary schools and nurseries) are statistically 
significant, none have economically significant effects.  The point estimates of all four coefficients for the full sample 
are zero up to four decimals. 
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a high school diploma has an estimate of 0.0091, also significant at the 1 percent level. 
 More surprisingly, the coefficient for the percent of the population with some 
college education is negative and insignificant. Compare this to the coefficient on the 
percent of the population with a bachelor degree or more: 0.0701, significant at the 1 
percent level.  A possible interpretation of this result concerns the opportunity cost of 
education: college education increases individual skills but it is costly (foregone wages). 
The results may imply that a complete college education represents a positive net return 
to individuals, while the net return on a 2-year degree is questionable.  Kane and Rouse 
(1995) and Surette (1997) report that the estimated return to 2-year degrees is positive 
and equals about 4-6 percent and 7-10 percent, respectively. Neither of these studies uses 
county-level data, however. In addition, these studies do not take into account the social 
return, which our results presumably do. Both studies look at costs (tuition, wages 
forgone, experience forgone, etc.) and benefits (wage premiums) while we consider the 
effect of educational attainment on the average growth of an economy over a 30-year 
period. What we might be detecting in our results, therefore, is a questionable social 
return to associate degrees. This is a potentially important finding for policy-makers. As 
Kane and Rouse (1995, p.600n) note, “Twenty percent of Federal Pell Grants, 10 percent 
of Guaranteed Student Loans, and over 20 percent of state expenditures for 
postsecondary education, go to community colleges.” 
In all four categories we can detect some heterogeneity across states.  For the “9 
to 11 years” variable, there are 6 statistically significant coefficient estimates, ranging 
from –0.0544 (Texas) to 0.1323 (Colorado).  A possible explanation for the positive 
coefficients may concern compulsory education laws.  The variable may include students 
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who would not have pursued a high school education given their druthers but were forced 
to.  There is an opportunity cost forced on rather-be-truant individuals and also a direct 
cost on school system to deal with them.  If individuals are pushed through the school 
system while not receiving the benefits of education, they forego the productive 
opportunities available and absorb resources that could have been spent on willing 
students. The data, however, is silent on this as each of the 6 states has roughly similar 
age spans of compulsion.  
Some heterogeneity is also detected across the “high school diploma” variable 
coefficients.  Of the 6 statistically significant coefficients, one is negative (Mississippi), 
while the remaining five are positive ranging from 0.0474 (Kentucky) to 0.1085 
(Idaho).27 For the some college education variable, the statistically significant coefficient 
estimates are all positive and range from 0.0390 (Texas) to 0.1493 (North Dakota). 
Finally, for the bachelor degree or more variable, we have 11 statistically significant 
coefficients, all positive, ranging from 0.0743 (Ohio) to 0.1764 (Tennessee). 
In sum, of the four educational attainment variables, the “bachelor degree or 
more” variable appears to be the most robust and economically the most important. 
 
iii. Industry Composition Effects 
Our data include 16 industry-level variables, measuring the percent of the 
population employed in the given industry.  Here we focus on three industry categories 
that have significant estimated effects for the full sample: (a) finance, insurance and real 
                                                 
27
 A reasonable explanation for this heterogeneity might be that schools are better in some states than others.  This can 
be informally tested by comparing average scholastic aptitude test (SAT) scores from the states with negative 
coefficient estimates to those with positive coefficient estimates.  It turns out however, that Mississippi has SAT 
average scores neither exceptionally high nor low relative to the other five states. This argument assumes that the 
predominant portion of the population with high school degrees obtained their diplomas in the considered state.  For 
entire states, this seems a priori plausible but not certain. 
  
 
18 
estate, (b) educational services, and (c) entertainment and recreational services.  The 
coefficients estimates for these variables are summarized in Table 5. 
 
a. Finance, Insurance and Real Estate Services 
We find positive correlation between the percent of the population employed in 
finance, insurance and real estate services and economic growth in the full sample.  The 
coefficient estimate is 0.0731, significant at the 1 percent level.  This might be a 
reflection of the link between financial intermediation and economic growth.  Rousseau 
and Wachtel (1998) report similar findings and Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and 
King and Levine (1993) offer theoretical models predicting this link. 
We find qualitative, as well as quantitative, heterogeneity across individual states.  
For 6 states, coefficient estimates are statistically significant.  For Louisiana the estimate 
is negative, for which we have no explanation.  For five states, the coefficient estimate is 
positive, ranging from 0.1292 (Illinois) to 0.6835 (North Dakota). 
 
b. Educational Services 
 The percent of the population providing education services is negatively 
correlated with growth in the full sample, with a point estimate of –0.0445, but it is not 
significant statistically.  For individual states, we find six cases of statistically significant 
coefficients, all negative, ranging from –0.1407 (Illinois) to –0.4666.   
 A possible reason for the negative relation might be that the benefits of education 
provided in a county are not entirely internalized by the county itself.  We find a positive 
correlation between some measures of human capital stocks and growth in section 5.ii, 
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but the correlation is silent as to where the stocks are accumulated.  For example, 
students may attend a college in one county but then move to another county as they join 
the workforce.28  Higgins et al (2006) report that this negative association is particularly 
strong in metro counties.  This is consistent with an externality argument in that a large 
proportion of colleges and universities are in metro areas, but many students leave the 
metro areas upon graduation. 
 
c. Entertainment and Recreational Services 
The estimated effect of the percent of the population employed in entertainment 
and recreation industries is positive and significant in the full sample with the point 
estimate of 0.0166.  This effect is important because entertainment and recreation 
services comprise an increasingly large segment of the U.S. economy (Costa, 1997). 
Seven states have statistically significant coefficients, and all seven are positive, 
ranging from 0.1751 (California) to 0.9807 (Mississippi).29 This positive correlation 
might be capturing the attraction of economic activity to counties with gambling casinos 
and professional sport teams (NHL, MLB, NFL, and NBA), as reported by Walker and 
Jackson (1998), Eadington (1999), and Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000). 
 
6. Conclusions 
We use over 3,000 US county-level data on 41 socio-economic variables to 
explore the variation in growth determination and income convergence across the US 
                                                 
28
 Another explanation could be a bureaucratic over-expansion of the public school systems.  This is explored by 
Marlow (2001) for California districts, and finds that an increase in the number of teachers has no statistically 
significant effect on SAT scores or dropout rates, while an increase in the size of administrative staff increases the SAT 
scores and decreases dropout rates. 
29
 The finding that California has the lowest point estimate is counter to what “common belief” would suggest that the 
home of Hollywood would be one where entertainment industry fostered economic growth. 
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states.  We employ a consistent 3SLS estimation procedure that does not bias 
convergence rate estimates downward. 
Convergence across the US averages nearly 7 percent per year—higher than the 2 
percent normally found with OLS.  Across 32 individual states, estimated convergence 
rates are above 2 percent with an average of 8.1 percent.  For 30 states the convergence 
rate is above 2 percent with 95 percent confidence.  We find substantial heterogeneity in 
individual state convergence rates.  For 7 states the convergence rate can be rejected as 
identical to at least one other state’s convergence rate with 95 percent confidence. 
The high convergence rates are encouraging in the sense that, given proper 
policies to induce and support balanced growth paths, laggard economies can close the 
gap relatively quickly.  Also encouraging is the fact that the partial correlation between 
convergence rates and initial income is negative.  However, when one considers the 
heterogeneity in convergence rate estimates across US states, one suspects that the 
heterogeneity in convergence rates across countries is likely more pronounced.  Since 
most cross-country empirical studies estimate a single convergence rate, the possibility of 
individual laggard economies with poor convergence prospects cannot be ruled out. 
In examining the determinants of balanced growth path heights, we find that 
government at all levels of decentralization is either unproductive or negatively 
correlated with economic growth.  Educational attainment of a population has a non-
linear relationship with economic growth: growth is positively related to high-school 
degree attainment, unrelated to obtaining some college education, and then positively 
related to four-year or more degree attainment.  Also, finance, insurance and real estate 
industry and entertainment industry are positively correlated with growth, while 
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education industry is negatively correlated with growth.  However, heterogeneity in the 
effects of balanced growth path determinants across individual states is harder to detect 
than heterogeneity of convergence rates. 
We should note that our convergence rate estimates are ultimately, based on a 
specification from the neoclassical growth model.  That model is of a closed economy 
and convergence is a phenomenon based entirely on diminishing returns to accumulated 
capital—specifically capital accumulated from the economy’s own savings.30  However, 
across US counties, especially within a given state, there is considerable capital mobility.  
Perfect capital mobility would predict immediate equalization of returns and 
instantaneous convergence, but convergence rates less than 100 percent may still obtain 
for open economies in the presence of adjustment costs to capital as well as imperfect 
capital markets (Levy, 2000 and 2004).  Barro et al (1995) demonstrate that gradual 
convergence will occur under partial capital mobility because “borrowing is possible to 
finance accumulation of physical capital, but not accumulation of human capital” (p. 
104).  If human capital accounts for a large share of income (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
1992, and Mankiw et al, 1992 suggest about one half), that can lead to gradual 
convergence.31 
These assumptions would imply (gradual) conditional convergence, and represent 
factors that would place reality somewhere between the convergence rate of a closed 
economy and the instant convergence of an open economy with perfect capital markets.  
Our estimates represent the effective convergence rates associated with that reality, or 
                                                 
30
 This can include both physical and, in the case of the augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al, 1992), human capital. 
31
 At the state level, there is evidence that even financing of physical capital from one state to another is not perfect.  
Driscoll (2004) finds that state-specific variation in deposits has a large effect on state-specific loans.  The intuition is 
that some firms that do not regard bank loans and forms of direct finance as perfect substitutes and out-of-state bank 
lending is not prevalent.  U.S. Federal regulation, until recently, restricted out-of-state bank lending and, even as late as 
1994, more than 70 percent of bank assets were in the control of within-state entities (Berger et al, 1995). 
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those realities specific to given states and, as such, an additional source of heterogeneity. 
Some readers have questioned the applicability of the neoclassical growth model 
to the US counties. We agree that the model may not be the most suitable framework for 
thinking about growth in US counties given their extraordinary degree of openness.  
Rappaport (1999, 2004, 2005, and 2006) proposes a way around this problem by offering 
a version of the model for studying local growth, where by “local” is meant small open 
economic units comprising a larger entity, such as counties comprising the US. The 
distinguishing characteristic of small open economies such as US counties is the 
extraordinary mobility of labor. The question, then, is how does labor mobility affect 
convergence? Rappaport (1999, 2005) expands the model by allowing labor mobility and 
finds that the model predicts conditional convergence, which is what we find here.32 
Future research could explore interactions of initial income and educational 
attainment in a more systematic way. Further, questions of the type explored here could 
be addressed using similar kind of county or district level data from other countries. 
                                                 
32
 Further, Rappaport (1999, 2005) finds that that convergence can either be accelerated (by a positive effect of out-
migration on wages) or slowed (by a resultant disincentive for capital accumulation) depending on relative changes in 
marginal products.  Rappaport's (2005) analysis suggests that at low levels of income the later effect dominates. 
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Data Appendix: Measurement of Per Capita Income 
 
Because of the critical importance of the income variable for the study of growth 
and convergence, we want to address its measurement in some detail. Two options were 
available to us for the construction of the county-level per capita income variable: (1) 
Census Bureau database, and (2) BEA-REIS database. 
Income information collected by the Census Bureau for states and counties is 
prepared decennially from the “long-form” sample conducted as part of the overall 
population census (BEA, 1994). This money income information is based on the self-
reported values by Census Survey respondents. An advantage of the Census Bureau’s 
data is that they are reported and recorded by place of residence. These data, however, are 
available only for the “benchmark” years, i.e., the years in which the decennial Census 
survey is conducted. 
The second source for this data, and the one chosen for this project, is personal 
income as measured by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).33 The definitions that 
are used for the components of personal income for the county estimates are essentially 
the same as those used for the national estimates. For example, the BEA defines 
“personal income” as the sum of wage and salary disbursements, other labor income, 
proprietors’ income (with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments), 
rental income (with capital consumption adjustment), personal dividend income and 
personal interest income. (BEA, 1994) “Wage and salary disbursements’ are 
measurements of pre-tax income paid to employees. “Other labor income” consists of 
                                                 
33
 The data and their measurement methods are described in detail in “Local Area Personal Income, 1969–1992” 
published by the BEA under the Regional Accounts Data, February 2, 2001. 
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payments by employers to employee benefit plans. “Proprietors’ income” is divided into 
two separate components—farm and non-farm. Per capita income is defined as the ratio 
of this personal income measure to the population of an area. 
The BEA’s estimates of personal income reflect the revised national estimates of 
personal income that resulted from the 1991 comprehensive revision and the 1992 and 
1993 annual revisions of the national income and product accounts. The revised national 
estimates were incorporated into the local area estimates of personal income as part of a 
comprehensive revision in May 1993. In addition, the estimates incorporate source data 
that were not available in time to be used in the comprehensive revisions.34 
The BEA compiles data from several different sources in order to derive this 
personal income measure. Some of the data used to prepare the components of personal 
income are reported and recorded by place of work rather than place of residence. 
Therefore, the initial estimates of these components are on a place-of-work basis. 
Consequently, these initial place-of-work estimates are adjusted so that they will be on a 
place-of-residence basis and so that the income of the recipients whose place of residence 
differs from their place of work will be correctly assigned to their county of residence. 
As a result, a place of residence adjustment is made to the data. This adjustment is 
made for inter-county commuters and border workers utilizing journey-to-work (JTW) 
data collected by Census. For the county estimates, the income of individuals who 
commute between counties is important in every multi-county metropolitan area and in 
many non-metropolitan areas. The residence adjustment estimate for a county is 
calculated as the total inflows of the income subject to adjustment to county i from 
                                                 
34
 For details of these revisions, see “Local Area Personal Income: Estimates for 1990–92 and Revisions to the 
Estimates for 1981–91,” Survey of Current Business 74 (April 1994), 127–129. 
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county j minus the total outflows of the income subject to adjustment from county i to 
county j. The estimates of the inflow and outflow data are prepared at the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) level and are calculated from the JTW data on the number 
of wage and salary workers and on their average wages by county of work for each 
county of residence from the Population Census. 
Given the data constraints, it was necessary to use an interpolation procedure for 
some variables.35 In this study we cover the 1970–1998 period. However, in order to 
implement the Evans’ (1997a, 1997b) 3SLS estimation method as described in section 2, 
we needed to have available data values for 1969 and 1997. We used a linear 
interpolation method to generate these missing observations. It should be noted that none 
of the data relating to income and population variables were generated by this method, as 
they were available from BEA-REIS on a yearly basis for the entire period covered. The 
Census data variables, which were available in 1970, 1980 and 1990, were interpolated in 
order to generate the 1969, 1997, and 1998 values. 
                                                 
35
 Given the cross-section nature of our data, the use of interpolation does not cause problems of the type reported by 
Dezhbakhsh and Levy (1994) in their study of periodic properties of interpolated time series. 
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Figure 1. 3,058 U.S.A Counties 
 
 
                                       
 
 
Note: Hawaiian and Alaskan counties are not shown. 
Figure 2. Point Estimates of Within-State Asymptotic Convergence Rates with 95% Confidence 
Intervals
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Table 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition Period Source 
Income  Per Capita Personal Income (excluding transfer 
payments) 
1969–1998 BEA 
Land area per capita Land area in km2/population 1970-1990 Census 
Water area per capita Water area in km2/population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 5-13 years Percent of 5–13 year olds in the population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 14-17 years Percent of 14–17 year olds in the population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 18-64 years Percent of 18–64 year olds in the population 1970-1990 Census 
Age: 65+ Percent of 65+ olds 1970-1990 Census 
Blacks Percent of Blacks 1970-1990 Census 
Hispanic Percent of Hispanics 1970-1990 Census 
Education: 9-11 years Percent of population with 11 years education or less 1970-1990 Census 
Education: H.S. diploma Percent of population with high school diploma 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Some college Percent of population with some college education 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Bachelor + Percent of population with bachelor degree or above 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Public elementary Number of students enrolled in public elementary 
schools 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Public nursery Number of students enrolled in public nurseries 1970-1990 Census 
Education: Private elementary Number of students enrolled in private elementary 
schools 
1970-1990 Census 
Education: Private nursery Number of students enrolled in private nurseries 1970-1990 Census 
Housing Median house value 1970-1990 Census 
Poverty Percent of the population below the poverty line 1970-1990 Census 
Federal government employment Percent of population employed by the federal 
government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
State government employment Percent of population employed by the state 
government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
Local government employment Percent of population employed by the local 
government in the county 
1969-1998 BEA 
Self-employment Percent of population self-employed 1970-1990 Census 
Agriculture Percent of population employed in agriculture 1970-1990 Census 
Communications Percent of population employed in communications 1970-1990 Census 
Construction Percent of population employed in construction 1970-1990 Census 
Entertainment & Recreational 
Services 
Percent of population employed in entertainment & 
recreational services 
1970-1990 Census 
Finance, insurance & real estate Percent of population employed in finance, insurance, 
and real estate 
1970-1990 Census 
Manufacturing: durables Percent of population employed in Manufacturing of 
durables 
1970-1990 Census 
Manufacturing: non-durables Percent of population employed in manufacturing of 
non-durables 
1970-1990 Census 
Mining  Percent of population employed in mining 1970-1990 Census 
Retail Percent of population employed in retail trade 1970-1990 Census 
Transportation Percent of the population employed in transportation    
Business & repair services Percent of population employed in business and repair 
services 
1970-1990 Census 
Educational services Percent of population employed in education services 1970-1990 Census 
Professional related services Percent of population employed in professional 
services 
1970-1990 Census 
Health services Percent of population employed in health services 1970-1990 Census 
Personal services Percent of population employed in personal services 1970-1990 Census 
Wholesale trade Percent of population employed in wholesale trade 1970-1990 Census 
College Town Dummy Variable: 1 if the county had a college or 
university enrollment to population ratio greater than 
or equal to 5% and 0 otherwise. 
1970 National Center 
for Educational 
Statistics 
Metro area 1970 Dummy Variable: 1 if the county was in a metro area 
in 1970, and 0 otherwise 
1970 Census 
 
Note: All BEA variables are available annually from 1969 to 1998.  All Census variables are gathered from the 1970, 1980 & 
1990 Census tapes.  Values for 1969 were obtained via the interpolation method as discussed in the data section. 
 
 
 Table 2. Asymptotic Conditional Convergence Rates: Point Estimates with 95% Confidence Intervalsa 
 
State  No. of Counties   OLS             C-R OLS    3SLS 
 
United Statesb        3,058   0.0239 (0.0224, 0.0255)  0.0239 (0.0213, 0.0267)   0.0658 (0.0632, 0.0981) 
 
Alabama           67    0.0424 (0.0036, 0.1080)  0.0424 (0.0394, 0.0457)   0.0931 (0.0492, 0.1466) 
Arkansas           74    0.0479 (0.0166, 0.1098)   0.0479 (0.0458, 0.0503)   0.0738 (0.0570, 0.1363) 
California          58    0.0457 (0.0046, 0.1249)  0.0457 (0.0438, 0.0479)   0.0375 (0.0178, 0.0868)  
Colorado                    63    0.0166 (0.0031, 0.0384)  0.0166 (0.0160, 0.0173)   0.0759 (0.0426, 0.1009) 
Florida           67    0.0268 (0.0010, 0.1109)  0.0268 (0.0244, 0.0293)   0.0767 (0.0480, 0.1174) 
Georgia          159    0.0230 (0.0109, 0.0413)  0.0230 (0.0223, 0.0237)   0.1043 (0.0699, 0.1142)  
Idaho           44    0.0892 (0.0021, 0.1566)  0.0892 (0.0845, 0.1254)   0.0913 (0.0471, 0.1145) 
Illinois          102    0.0434 (0.0213, 0.1168)  0.0434 (0.0415, 0.0454)   0.0537 (0.0337, 0.1062) 
Indiana           92    0.0067 (-0.0054, 0.0245)  0.0067 (0.0057, 0.0076)   0.0622 (0.0354, 0.1221) 
Iowa           99    0.0570 (0.0224, 0.1176)  0.0570 (0.0551, 0.0589)   0.0574 (0.0175, 0.0954) 
Kansas          106    0.0560 (0.0360, 0.1086)  0.0560 (0.0533, 0.0589)   0.0639 (0.0434, 0.1228) 
Kentucky          120    0.0431 (0.0233, 0.0922)  0.0431 (0.0418, 0.0444)   0.1054 (0.0561, 0.1160) 
Louisiana          64    0.0341 (0.0128, 0.0955)  0.0341 (0.0336, 0.0346)   0.1555 (0.0989, 0.1940) 
Michigan           83    0.0121 (-0.0043, 0.0427)  0.0121 (0.0110, 0.0132)   0.1152 (0.0536, 0.1659) 
Minnesota          87    0.0202 (0.0053, 0.0459)  0.0202 (0.0196, 0.0209)   0.0454 (0.0305, 0.0719) 
Mississippi          82    0.0249 (0.0009, 0.1509)  0.0249 (0.0234, 0.0265)   0.1405 (0.0455, 0.1923)  
Missouri          115    0.0230 (0.0094, 0.0452)  0.0230 (0.0223, 0.0237)   0.0817 (0.0387, 0.1132) 
Montana           56    0.0359 (0.0099, 0.0996)  0.0359 (0.0334, 0.0387)   0.0865 (0.0367, 0.1566) 
New York          62    0.0111 (-0.0238, 0.0284)  0.0111 (0.0099, 0.0172)   0.0465 (0.0285, 0.0853) 
North Carolina         100    0.0228 (0.0078, 0.0491)  0.0228 (0.0225, 0.0232)   0.1302 (0.0966, 0.1574) 
North Dakota                   53    0.0528 (0.0103, 0.1247)  0.0528 (0.0413, 0.0700)   0.0761 (0.0353, 0.1102) 
Ohio           88    0.0170 (-0.0005, 0.0520)  0.0170 (0.0157, 0.0182)   0.0503 (0.0299, 0.1059) 
Oklahoma          77    0.0415 (0.0139, 0.1136)  0.0415 (0.0397, 0.0433)   0.1152 (0.0574, 0.1437) 
Pennsylvania          67    0.0240 ( 0.0043, 0.0707)  0.0240 (0.0225, 0.0255)   0.0705 (0.0291, 0.1099) 
South Carolina             46    0.0142 (-0.0147, 0.1259)  0.0142 (0.0128, 0.0157)   0.0960 (0.0243, 0.1315) 
South Dakota          66    0.0274 (0.0036, 0.1391)   0.0274 (0.0250, 0.0300)   0.0406 (0.0184, 0.1144) 
Tennessee           97    0.0287 (0.0102, 0.0689)  0.0287 (0.0278, 0.0295)   0.0681 (0.0488, 0.1168) 
Texas          254    0.0312 (0.0208, 0.0458)  0.0312 (0.0298, 0.0326)   0.1170 (0.0675, 0.1564) 
Virginia           84    0.0047 (-0.0074, 0.0227)  0.0047 (0.0038, 0.0056)   0.0703 (0.0500, 0.1271) 
Washington          39    0.0518 (-.0119, 0.0971)   0.0518 (0.0252, 0.0302)   0.0845 (0.0448, 0.1449) 
West Virginia          55    0.0040 (-0.0184, 0.0199)    0.0040 (0.0029, 0.0050)   0.0634 (0.0466, 0.0972) 
Wisconsin          70    0.0270 (0.0077, 0.0716)  0.0270 (0.0254, 0.0286)   0.0390 (0.0231, 0.0688) 
 
Notes: 
a) Following Evans (1997b, footnote 17, p. 16), we use ( ) TTc /111 β+−=  to compute the asymptotic rate of convergence.  The confidence 
intervals (in parentheses) are obtained in two steps.  First we obtain the end points of the β confidence intervals by computing ( ).e.s. ×± 961β , 
where s.e. is the standard error associated with the β estimate.  Next, these endpoints are plugged into ( ) TTc /111 β+−= .  If the low value of 
the confidence interval is less than –T -1, the higher value is set equal to one.  It is clear from the above that the confidence intervals computed 
this way may be asymmetric around the point estimates. As Figure 2 indicates, this is indeed the case in our data. 
 
b) See Higgins, Levy and Young (2006) for full set of results for the U.S. 
Table 3. Analysis of Growth: The Effect of Select Government Variables 
 
     
      Federal Government Employment      __                      State Government Employment                       __                      Local Government Employment                    ___   
 
Region  ____OLS______ ____C-R OLS___ ____3SLS_____ ____OLS_____ ____C-ROLS___ ____3SLS_____ ____OLS______ ____C-R OLS___ ____3SLS___   
 
United States -0.0145 (0.0048)a -0.0145 (0.0046)a -0.0226 (0.0051)a -0.0040 (0.0037) -0.0040 (0.0045) -0.0163 (0.0040)a -0.0211 (0.0048)a -0.0211 (0.0079)a -0.0204 (0.0025)a  
 
Alabama   0.0327 (0.0635)  0.0327 (0.0013)a  0.0434 (0.0577) -0.0473 (0.0595) -0.0473 (0.0028)a -0.0514 (0.0579)  0.0221 (0.0573)  0.0221 (0.0019)a  0.0225 (0.0565)  
Arkansas  -0.0085 (0.0503) -0.0085 (0.0029)a -0.0119 (0.0514) -0.0164 (0.0393) -0.0164 (0.0012)a -0.0251 (0.0398) -0.0424 (0.0494) -0.0424 (0.0023)a -0.0242 (0.0493)  
California   0.0321 (0.0312)  0.0321 (0.0011)a  0.0322 (0.0304)  0.0134 (0.0488)  0.0134 (0.0031)a  0.0141 (0.0455) -0.0148 (0.0992) -0.0148 (0.0018)a -0.0137 (0.0943)  
Colorado  -0.0249 (0.0389) -0.0249 (0.0022)a -0.0643 (0.0451) -0.0338 (0.0384) -0.0338 (0.0024)a -0.0729 (0.0346)c -0.0174 (0.0339) -0.0174 (0.0026)a -0.0362 (0.0404)  
Florida   0.0821 (0.0821)  0.0821 (0.0035)a  0.0686 (0.0888)  0.0100 (0.0585)  0.0100 (0.0042)b  0.0223 (0.0632) -0.0228 (0.0894) -0.0228 (0.0023)a  0.0235 (0.0947)  
Georgia   0.0309 (0.0339)  0.0309 (0.0015)a  0.0078 (0.0365)  0.0301 (0.0232)  0.0301 (0.0013)a  0.0193 (0.0251)  0.0477 (0.0289)c  0.0477 (0.0032)a  0.0294 (0.0312)  
Idaho  -0.1485 (0.0881)c -0.1485 (0.0043)a -0.1368 (0.0648)c  0.0552 (0.0586)  0.0552 (0.0022)a  0.0458 (0.0365)  0.0379 (0.1142)  0.0379 (0.0060)a  0.0197 (0.0713)  
Illinois   0.0478 (0.0325)  0.0478 (0.0018)a  0.0487 (0.0322)  0.0034 (0.0195)  0.0034 (0.0007)a  0.0034 (0.0193)  0.0071 (0.0240)  0.0071 (0.0017)a  0.0071 (0.0238)  
Indiana  -0.0969 (0.0491)b -0.0969 (0.0011)a -0.0586 (0.0357)  0.0324 (0.0278)  0.0324 (0.0009)a  0.0009 (0.0297) -0.0311 (0.0381) -0.0311 (0.0015)a -0.0311 (0.0381)  
Iowa   0.0605 (0.0392)  0.0605 (0.0018)a  0.0607 (0.0389) -0.0414 (0.0236)b -0.0414 (0.0014)a -0.0423 (0.0231)b  0.0124 (0.0273)  0.0124 (0.0015)a  0.0137 (0.0265)  
Kansas   0.0281 (0.0394)  0.0281 (0.0024)a  0.0278 (0.0393)  0.0130 (0.0173)  0.0130 (0.0011)a  0.0113 (0.0171)  0.0329 (0.0183)c  0.0329 (0.0012)a  0.0337 (0.0182)c  
Kentucky  -0.0080 (0.0232) -0.0080 (0.0018)a -0.0058 (0.0023)  0.0155 (0.0200)  0.0155 (0.0016)a  0.0133 (0.0200)  0.0026 (0.0253)  0.0026 (0.0016)a -0.0001 (0.0253)  
Louisiana  -0.0428 (0.0309) -0.0428 (0.0008)a -0.0131 (0.0057) -0.0024 (0.0282) -0.0024 (0.0012)b -0.0130 (0.0336) -0.1463 (0.0500)a -0.1463 (0.0030)a -0.1792 (0.0589)a  
Michigan   0.0442 (0.0435)  0.0442 (0.0027)a  0.0740 (0.0500) -0.0091 (0.0291) -0.0091 (0.0007)a -0.0566 (0.0313)c -0.0100 (0.0335) -0.0100 (0.0023)a -0.0478 (0.0376)  
Minnesota  -0.1118 (0.0633)c -0.1118 (0.0028)a -0.0783 (0.0645)  0.0217 (0.0247)  0.0217 (0.0015)a  0.0048 (0.0247) -0.0461 (0.0235)b -0.0461 (0.0013)a -0.0431 (0.0246)c 
Mississippi -0.0521 (0.0591) -0.0521 (0.0017)a -0.0180 (0.0626) -0.0333 (0.0508) -0.0333 (0.0025)a -0.0303 (0.0494) -0.0467 (0.0675) -0.0467 (0.0037)a -0.1325 (0.0660)b  
Missouri  -0.0547 (0.0269)b -0.0547 (0.0021)a -0.0917 (0.0320)a -0.0292 (0.0210) -0.0292 (0.0018)a -0.0655 (0.0244)a -0.0243 (0.0244) -0.0243 (0.0028)a -0.0205 (0.0298)  
Montana  -0.0481 (0.0650) -0.0481 (0.0097)a -0.0739 (0.0632)  0.0457 (0.0493)  0.0457 (0.0108)a  0.0144 (0.0440)  0.0288 (0.0500)  0.0288 (0.0059)a  0.0260 (0.0508)  
New York   0.0254 (0.1075)  0.0254 (0.0036)a  0.0852 (0.1233)  0.0257 (0.0402)  0.0257 (0.0023)a  0.0609 (0.0450) -0.0314 (0.0712) -0.0314 (0.0042)a -0.0362 (0.0831)  
North Carolina -0.0570 (0.0544)c -0.0570 (0.0038)a -0.1263 (0.0648) -0.0129 (0.0238) -0.0129 (0.0021)a -0.0422 (0.0285)  0.0166 (0.0467)  0.0166 (0.0048)a -0.0101 (0.0568)  
North Dakota  0.1636 (0.0988)c  0.1636 (0.0098)a  0.2348 (0.1126)b  0.1326 (0.0691)c  0.1326 (0.0051)a  0.1604 (0.0811)b  0.2070 (0.0782)a  0.2070 (0.0086)a  0.2491 (0.0910)a  
Ohio  -0.0307 (0.0567) -0.0307 (0.0043)a -0.0263 (0.0574) -0.0072 (0.0263) -0.0072 (0.0018)a -0.0155 (0.0261) -0.0219 (0.0499) -0.0219 (0.0018)a -0.0002 (0.0485)  
Oklahoma  -0.1130 (0.0506)b -0.1130 (0.0080)a -0.1065 (0.0520)b -0.0366 (0.0357) -0.0366 (0.0019)a -0.0467 (0.0364) -0.0789 (0.0416)c -0.0789 (0.0023)a -0.0880 (0.0426)b  
Pennsylvania  0.0264 (0.0577)  0.0264 (0.0028)a  0.0267 (0.0285)  0.0577 (0.0287)b  0.0577 (0.0018)a  0.0620 (0.0283) -0.1015 (0.0593)c -0.1015 (0.0038)a -0.1000 (0.0592)  
South Carolina -0.0582 (0.1065) -0.0582 (0.0040)a -0.0520 (0.1028)  0.0183 (0.1384)  0.0183 (0.0042)a -0.0280 (0.1163) -0.0334 (0.1454) -0.0334 (0.0115)a -0.0270 (0.1406)  
South Dakota -0.0144 (0.0454) -0.0144 (0.0031)a -0.0384 (0.0424) -0.0043 (0.0323) -0.0043 (0.0019)b -0.0057 (0.0453)  0.0063 (0.0455)  0.0063 (0.0019)a -0.0057 (0.0453)  
Tennessee   0.0110 (0.0321)  0.0110 (0.0062)c  0.0054 (0.0353) -0.0267 (0.0330) -0.0267 (0.0027)a -0.0566 (0.0352)  0.0022 (0.0336)  0.0022 (0.0021)  0.0059 (0.0370)  
Texas  -0.0551 (0.0302)c -0.0551 (0.0039)a -0.0378 (0.0318)  0.0053 (0.0178)  0.0053 (0.0024)b -0.0007 (0.0188) -0.0252 (0.0210)  -0.0252 (0.0033)a -0.0271 (0.0222)  
Virginia  -0.0088 (0.0346) -0.0088 (0.0022)a  0.0053 (0.0404)  0.0390 (0.0413)  0.0390 (0.0027)a  0.0310 (0.0484)  0.0471 (0.0466)  0.0471 (0.0033)a  0.0261 (0.0543)  
Washington -0.0249 (0.0551) -0.0249 (0.0031)a -0.0085 (0.0885)  0.0167 (0.1323)   0.0167 (0.0065)b -0.0085 (0.0885)  0.1718 (0.3523)  0.1718 (0.0132)a -0.0502 (0.5439)  
West Virginia  0.0571 (0.0653)  0.0571 (0.0032)a  0.0980 (0.0810) -0.0060 (0.0413) -0.0060 (0.0019)a -0.0185 (0.0519) -0.0605 (0.0788) -0.0605 (0.0041)a -0.0067 (0.0975)  
Wisconsin  -0.0087 (0.0364) -0.0087 (0.0028)a  -0.0017 (0.0358) -0.0444 (0.0343) -0.0444 (0.0038)a -0.0375 (0.0337)  0.0191 (0.0400)  0.0191 (0.0021)a  0.0264 (0.0394)  
 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
a
 Significant at the 1% level. 
b
 Significant at  the 5 % level. 
c
 Significant at the 10% level. 
Table 4A. Analysis of Growth: The Effect of Select Education Variables 
          
                           ____ 9-11 Years and No More_                                                            _____      _   High School Diploma_                    _ 
            
Region     _      _OLS    __ __  C-R OLS  __ ____ 3SLS_ _ _  _      _OLS    __ _   C-R OLS __ ____  3SLS_ __   
 
United States  -0.0209 (0.0033)a -0.0209 (0.0089)b -0.0204 (0.0035)a   0.0007 (0.0027)  0.0007 (0.0052)  0.0091 (0.0029)a   
 
Alabama    0.0864 (0.0424)a  0.0864 (0.0029)a  0.0876 (0.0417)b   0.0147 (0.0484)  0.0147 (0.0036)a  0.0122 (0.0474)   
Arkansas   -0.0196 (0.0318) -0.0196 (0.0024)a -0.0181 (0.0325)   0.0096 (0.0325)  0.0096 (0.0023)a  0.0199 (0.0327)   
California   -0.0662 (0.0744) -0.0662 (0.0105)a -0.0659 (0.0724)  -0.0395 (0.0042) -0.0395 (0.0026)a -0.0395 (0.0412)   
Colorado    0.1174 (0.0424)a  0.1174 (0.0046)a  0.1323 (0.0510)a   0.0181 (0.0282)  0.0181 (0.0015)a  0.0621 (0.0307)b   
Florida   -0.1329 (0.0901) -0.1329 (0.0069)a -0.0219 (0.0846)   0.0351 (0.0697)  0.0351 (0.0096)a  0.0622 (0.0846)   
Georgia   -0.0097 (0.0142) -0.0097 (0.0022)a  0.0077 (0.0150)   0.0028 (0.0161)  0.0028 (0.0031)  0.0114 (0.0150)   
Idaho    0.0530 (0.0807)  0.0530 (0.0037)a  0.0507 (0.0751)   0.1074 (0.0465)b  0.1074 (0.0021)a  0.1085 (0.0433)b   
Illinois   -0.0585 (0.0189)a -0.0585 (0.0019)a -0.0586 (0.0187)a  -0.0102 (0.0112) -0.0102 (0.0014)a -0.0103 (0.0106)   
Indiana   -0.0454 (0.0238)c -0.0454 (0.0018)a -0.0327 (0.0263)  -0.0440 (0.0158)a -0.0440 (0.0012)a -0.0220 (0.0165)   
Iowa   -0.0242 (0.0248) -0.0242 (0.0022)a -0.0235 (0.0244)   0.0085 (0.0129)  0.0085 (0.0010)a  0.0084 (0.0128)   
Kansas   -0.0166 (0.0218) -0.0166 (0.0018)a -0.0151 (0.0216)   0.0518 (0.0125)a  0.0518 (0.0016)a  0.0526 (0.0124)a   
Kentucky    0.0051 (0.0266)  0.0051 (0.0032)  0.0039 (0.0267)   0.0443 (0.0181)b  0.0443 (0.0018)a  0.0474 (0.0179)a   
Louisiana   -0.0012 (0.0236) -0.0012 (0.0022)  0.0100 (0.0280)  -0.0253 (0.0175) -0.0253 (0.0024)a -0.0239 (0.0209)   
Michigan   -0.0312 (0.0279) -0.0312 (0.0028)a -0.0347 (0.0326)  -0.0111 (0.0222) -0.0111 (0.0016)a -0.0040 (0.0258)   
Minnesota   -0.0076 (0.0319) -0.0076 (0.0030)b -0.0167 (0.0331)   0.0157 (0.0319)  0.0157 (0.0018)a  0.0160 (0.0185)   
Mississippi  -0.0055 (0.0311) -0.0055 (0.0027)b  0.0070 (0.0334)  -0.0705 (0.0419)c -0.0705 (0.0026)a -0.0900 (0.0448)b  
Missouri   -0.0158 (0.0232) -0.0158 (0.0016)a -0.0256 (0.0283)  -0.0151 (0.0152) -0.0151 (0.0020)a  0.0172 (0.0174)   
Montana   -0.1558 (0.0800)c -0.1558 (0.0043)a -0.1496 (0.0813)c  -0.0280 (0.0432) -0.0280 (0.0038)a -0.0138 (0.0426)   
New York    0.0238 (0.0393)  0.0238 (0.0066)a  0.0352 (0.0456)  -0.0392 (0.0428) -0.0392 (0.0029)a -0.0703 (0.0486)   
North Carolina   0.0178 (0.0186)  0.0178 (0.0025)a  0.0317 (0.0225)   0.0074 (0.0178)  0.0074 (0.0024)a  0.0223 (0.0215)   
North Dakota  -0.0341 (0.0479) -0.0341 (0.0025)a -0.0270 (0.0566)  -0.0506 (0.0390) -0.0506 (0.0037)a -0.0304 (0.0454)   
Ohio    0.0279 (0.0286)  0.0279 (0.0032)a  0.0221 (0.0287)  -0.0311 (0.0177)c -0.0311 (0.0013)a -0.0284 (0.0178)   
Oklahoma   -0.0064 (0.0367) -0.0064 (0.0026)b -0.0036 (0.0378)   0.0453 (0.0241)c  0.0453 (0.0017)a  0.0608 (0.0234)a   
Pennsylvania   0.0063 (0.0276)  0.0063 (0.0022)a  0.0058 (0.0276)  -0.0188 (0.0197) -0.0188 (0.0020)a -0.0224 (0.0193)   
South Carolina  -0.0298 (0.0514) -0.0298 (0.0026)a -0.0225 (0.0487)  -0.0103 (0.0898) -0.0103 (0.0033)a -0.0169 (0.0865)   
South Dakota  -0.0764 (0.0340)b -0.0764 (0.0027)a -0.0675 (0.0339)b   0.0093 (0.0209)  0.0093 (0.0016)a  0.0166 (0.0205)   
Tennessee   -0.0146 (0.0277) -0.0146 (0.0035)a  0.0044 (0.0299)   0.0149 (0.0277)  0.0149 (0.0027)a  0.0151 (0.0305)   
Texas   -0.0467 (0.0116)c -0.0467 (0.0014)a -0.0544 (0.0122)a   0.0109 (0.0126)  0.0109 (0.0037)a  0.0072 (0.0134)   
Virginia    0.0145 (0.0228)  0.0145 (0.0016)a  0.0180 (0.0267)   0.0181 (0.0276)  0.0181 (0.0017)a  0.0445 (0.0315)   
Washington  -0.1776 (0.2789) -0.1776 (0.0082)a -0.0318 (0.4374)  -0.3253 (0.2056) -0.3253 (0.0057)a  0.0061 (0.2082)  
West Virginia   0.0073 (0.0493)  0.0073 (0.0017)a  0.0421 (0.0609)  -0.0708 (0.0406)c -0.0708 (0.0018)a -0.0225 (0.0482)   
Wisconsin   -0.0325 (0.0313) -0.0325 (0.0026)a -0.0248 (0.0304)  -0.0288 (0.0172)c -0.0288 (0.0015)a -0.0268 (0.0164) 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
a
 Significant at 1% level. 
b
 Significant at 5% level. 
c
 Significant at 10% level. 
Table 4B. Analysis of Growth: The Effect of Select Education Variables 
         
                              Some College Education                                                                                                   Bachelor Degree or Higher                                        _ 
           
Region     _      _OLS    __ __  C-R OLS  __ ____ 3SLS_ _ _   _      _OLS    __ _   C-R OLS __ ____  3SLS_ __   
  
United States  -0.0106 (0.0056)c -0.0106 (0.0089) -0.0014 (0.0061)    0.0424 (0.0058)a  0.0424 (0.0108)a  0.0701 (0.0061)a   
 
Alabama    0.1202 (0.0993)  0.1202 (0.0107)a  0.1359 (0.0911)    0.0354 (0.0661)  0.0354 (0.0042)a  0.0350 (0.0653)   
Arkansas    0.0249 (0.0684)  0.0249 (0.0040)a  0.0279 (0.0700)    0.1137 (0.0833)  0.1137 (0.0099)a  0.1475 (0.0826)c   
California    0.0808 (0.0781)  0.0808 (0.0066)a  0.0808 (0.0749)    0.0901 (0.0592)  0.0901 (0.0037)a  0.0918 (0.0469)c   
Colorado    0.1150 (0.0584)b  0.1150 (0.0081)a  0.0674 (0.0687)    0.0725 (0.0374)b  0.0725 (0.0036)a  0.1298 (0.0409)a   
Florida    0.0622 (0.1298)  0.0625 (0.0089)a  0.1802 (0.1308)   -0.0541 (0.1026) -0.0541 (0.0091)a  0.0971 (0.0893)   
Georgia    0.0776 (0.0413)c  0.0776 (0.0037)a  0.0634 (0.0449)    0.0260 (0.0316)  0.0260 (0.0028)a  0.0279 (0.0339)    
Idaho   -0.0041 (0.0637) -0.0041 (0.0057) -0.0093 (0.0552)    0.0529 (0.1543)  0.0529 (0.0168)a  0.0372 (0.1274)   
Illinois    0.0155 (0.0315)  0.0155 (0.0038)a  0.0154 (0.0311)    0.0401 (0.0322)  0.0401 (0.0027)a  0.0398 (0.0308)   
Indiana    0.1215 (0.0529)b  0.1215 (0.0034)a  0.1230 (0.0591)b   -0.0434 (0.0508) -0.0434 (0.0032)a  0.0373 (0.0516)   
Iowa    0.0098 (0.0280)  0.0098 (0.0028)a  0.0111 (0.0271)   -0.0187 (0.0319)  0.0351 (0.0032)a -0.0193 (0.0316)   
Kansas    0.0009 (0.0207)  0.0009 (0.0015)  0.0051 (0.0198)    0.0351 (0.0266)  0.0351 (0.0016)a  0.0382 (0.0262) 
Kentucky    0.0595 (0.0423)  0.0595 (0.0038)a  0.0630 (0.0423)    0.0492 (0.0457)  0.0492 (0.0040)a  0.0578 (0.0452)   
Louisiana    0.0497 (0.0544)  0.0497 (0.0048)a  0.1022 (0.0627)    0.0306 (0.0517)  0.0306 (0.0032)a  0.0459 (0.0616)   
Michigan   -0.0189 (0.0480) -0.0189 (0.0039)a  0.0173 (0.0551)    0.0316 (0.0343)  0.0316 (0.0033)a  0.0926 (0.0362)b   
Minnesota    0.0289 (0.0358)  0.0289 (0.0031)a  0.0472 (0.0365)    0.0399 (0.0408)  0.0399 (0.0031)a  0.0414 (0.0426)   
Mississippi   0.0313 (0.0629)  0.0313 (0.0048)a -0.0249 (0.0649)   -0.0905 (0.0789) -0.0905 (0.0061)a -0.0002 (0.0788)   
Missouri   -0.0103 (0.0321) -0.0103 (0.0046)a -0.0288 (0.0391)    0.0653 (0.0333)b  0.0653 (0.0042)a  0.1259 (0.0388)a   
Montana   -0.0002 (0.0420) -0.0002 (0.0035)  0.0131 (0.0415)    0.0106 (0.0534)  0.0106 (0.0022)a  0.0265 (0.0529)   
New York    0.0171 (0.0757)  0.0171 (0.0034)a  0.0453 (0.0877)    0.0627 (0.0624)  0.0627 (0.0026)a  0.1673 (0.0616)a   
North Carolina   0.0091 (0.0410)  0.0091 (0.0036)b -0.0282 (0.0495)    0.0446 (0.0344)  0.0446 (0.0030)a  0.1161 (0.0391)a   
North Dakota   0.1271 (0.1270)b  0.1271 (0.0053)a  0.1493 (0.0666)b   -0.0158 (0.0981) -0.0158 (0.0142) -0.0148 (0.1162)   
Ohio    0.1224 (0.0530)b  0.1224 (0.0042)a  0.1453 (0.0516)a    0.0664 (0.0439)  0.0664 (0.0044)a  0.0743 (0.0442)c   
Oklahoma    0.0230 (0.0498)  0.0230 (0.0054)a  0.0538 (0.0484)    0.0289 (0.0389)  0.0289 (0.0053)a  0.0332 (0.0400)   
Pennsylvania   0.0108 (0.0560)  0.0108 (0.0060)c  0.0148 (0.0558)    0.1756 (0.0497)a  0.1756 (0.0042)a  0.1972 (0.0443)   
South Carolina   0.1544 (0.2155)  0.1544 (0.0105)a  0.1995 (0.1984)   -0.0270 (0.2123) -0.0270 (0.0086)a  0.0369 (0.1838)   
South Dakota   0.0405 (0.0449)  0.0405 (0.0030)a  0.0493 (0.0451)   -0.0389 (0.0569) -0.0389 (0.0037)a -0.0245 (0.0567)   
Tennessee   -0.0672 (0.0585) -0.0672 (0.0060)a -0.0728 (0.0644)    0.1118 (0.0551)b  0.1118 (0.0091)a  0.1764 (0.0586)a   
Texas    0.0372 (0.0208)  0.0372 (0.0052)a  0.0390 (0.0220)b    0.0211 (0.0243)  0.0211 (0.0028)a  0.0032 (0.0252)   
Virginia   -0.0588 (0.0709) -0.0588 (0.0070)a -0.0764 (0.0830)    0.0611 (0.0528)  0.0611 (0.0052)a  0.1354 (0.0583)b   
Washington  -0.1544 (0.1287) -0.1544 (0.0024)a  0.0499 (0.1331)    0.0631 (0.3615)  0.0631 (0.0078)a -0.0076 (0.5835)   
West Virginia   0.0119 (0.0816)  0.0119 (0.0032)a -0.0145 (0.1025)    0.0127 (0.1123)  0.0127 (0.0078)  0.1077 (0.1374)   
Wisconsin    0.0116 (0.0348)  0.0116 (0.0016)a  0.0227 (0.0331)    0.0703 (0.0424)  0.0703 (0.0029)a  0.0921 (0.0368)b 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
a
 Significant at 1% level. 
b
 Significant at 5% level. 
c
 Significant at 10% level. 
Table 5. Analysis of Growth: The Effect of Select Industry Composition Variables 
     
                      Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate                  _                               Educational Services                             _                Entertainment and Recreational Services                  
 
Region  ____OLS___ ____C-R OLS___ ____3SLS___ ____OLS___ ____C-R OLS___ ____3SLS___ ____OLS___ ____C-R OLS___ ____3SLS___   
 
United States  0.0632 (0.0117)a  0.0632 (0.0233)a  0.0731 (0.0125)a -0.0257 (0.0082)a -0.0257 (0.0060)a -0.0445 (0.0087)  0.0272 (0.0154)c  0.0272 (0.0230)  0.0335 (0.0166)b  
 
Alabama   0.2482 (0.1525)c  0.2482 (0.0057)a  0.2642 (0.1458)c -0.1586 (0.1912) -0.1586 (0.0103)a -0.1835 (0.1798)  0.0127 (0.3372)  0.0127 (0.0212)  0.0165 (0.3325) 
Arkansas   0.0146 (0.1124)  0.0146 (0.0064)b  0.0155 (0.1151)  0.0972 (0.0780)  0.0972 (0.0037)a  0.1070 (0.0796) -0.1725 (0.1915) -0.1725 (0.0196)a -0.1336 (0.1945) 
California   0.0625 (0.0956)  0.0625 (0.0075)a  0.0639 (0.0892)  0.0238 (0.1275)  0.0238 (0.0195)  0.0254 (0.1206)  0.1749 (0.0744)b  0.1749 (0.0040)a  0.1751 (0.0724)b 
Colorado   0.1602 (0.0885)c  0.1602 (0.0077)a  0.0962 (0.1047)  0.1536 (0.0843)c  0.1536 (0.0061)a  0.1387 (0.1018)  0.0655 (0.1162)  0.0655 (0.0080)a  0.1410 (0.1162)  
Florida   0.1226 (0.1210)  0.1226 (0.0094)a  0.1121 (0.1312) -0.2992 (0.2080) -0.2992 (0.0235)a -0.4666 (0.2131)b  0.2011 (0.2475)  0.2011 (0.0183)a  0.1682 (0.2680) 
Georgia  -0.0375 (0.0714) -0.0375 (0.0055)a -0.0513 (0.0776)  0.0540 (0.0665)  0.0540 (0.0039)a  0.0409 (0.0723)  0.2172 (0.1262)c  0.2172 (0.0088)a  0.2617 (0.1369)b  
Idaho  -0.2663 (0.2141) -0.2663 (0.0133)a -0.2609 (0.1993) -0.3225 (0.2219) -0.3225 (0.0192)a -0.2925 (0.1613)c -0.1767 (0.3483) -0.1767 (0.0415)a -0.1881 (0.3230) 
Illinois   0.1293 (0.0487)a  0.1293 (0.0076)a  0.1292 (0.0482)a -0.1407 (0.0684)a -0.1407 (0.0024)a -0.1407 (0.0678)b  0.4266 (0.1635)a  0.4266 (0.0168)a  0.4265 (0.1622)a  
Indiana  -0.0809 (0.0849) -0.0809 (0.0049)a -0.0055 (0.0923) -0.2438 (0.1008)b -0.2438 (0.0065)a -0.3410 (0.1090)a  0.0554 (0.2051)  0.0554 (0.0270)b  0.1228 (0.2283)  
Iowa   0.1280 (0.0920)  0.1280 (0.0082)a  0.1312 (0.0902) -0.0334 (0.0484) -0.0334 (0.0049)a -0.0340 (0.0479)  0.1931 (0.1870)  0.1931 (0.0154)a  0.1975 (0.1845)  
Kansas   0.0819 (0.0611)  0.0819 (0.0051)a  0.0827 (0.0608) -0.0184 (0.0387) -0.0184 (0.0042)a -0.0191 (0.0386)  0.0667 (0.1089)  0.0667 (0.0079)a  0.0587 (0.1080) 
Kentucky  -0.0590 (0.0636) -0.0590 (0.0042)a -0.0616 (0.0638)  0.0568 (0.0635)  0.0568 (0.0040)a  0.0445 (0.0628)  0.0868 (0.1512)  0.0868 (0.0111)a  0.0597 (0.1499)    
Louisiana  -0.3930 (0.1158)a -0.3930 (0.0086)a -0.4513 (0.1373)a  0.0923 (0.0795)  0.0923 (0.0055)a  0.0386 (0.0935)  0.1019 (0.2055)  0.1019 (0.0102)a  0.3692 (0.2291)  
Michigan   0.1550 (0.0927)c  0.1550 (0.0104)a  0.1718 (0.1080) -0.0541 (0.0907) -0.0541 (0.0082)a -0.0447 (0.1057) -0.0656 (0.2009) -0.0656 (0.0311)b -0.1524 (0.2330)   
Minnesota  -0.0210 (0.0973) -0.0210 (0.0095)b  0.0711 (0.0932) -0.0089 (0.0653) -0.0089 (0.0084) -0.0684 (0.0630) -0.0834 (0.1741) -0.0834 (0.0177)a -0.0356 (0.1807) 
Mississippi  0.1893 (0.1720)  0.1893 (0.0111)a  0.1215 (0.1846) -0.2570 (0.1238)b -0.2570 (0.0140)a -0.2330 (0.1338)c  0.9804 (0.3651)a  0.9804 (0.0347)a  0.9807 (0.3951)a  
Missouri   0.0047 (0.0555)  0.0047 (0.0075) -0.0006 (0.0677) -0.0088 (0.0531) -0.0088 (0.0064)  0.0324 (0.0643) -0.0965 (0.1564) -0.0965 (0.0157)a -0.1621 (0.1905)   
Montana   0.1329 (0.1171)  0.1329 (0.0133)a  0.1322 (0.1192) -0.0559 (0.0714) -0.0559 (0.0031)a -0.0418 (0.0718)  0.2509 (0.1795)  0.2509 (0.0203)a  0.2599 (0.1825)  
New York   0.0388 (0.0906)  0.0388 (0.0081)a  0.1049 (0.1027)  0.0081 (0.1500)  0.0081 (0.0143) -0.0412 (0.1739)  0.4809 (0.3271)  0.4809 (0.0234)a  0.9166 (0.3458)a  
North Carolina  0.0002 (0.0979)  0.0002 (0.0095) -0.0582 (0.1190)  0.1124 (0.0923)  0.1124 (0.0068)a  0.1193 (0.1128)  0.2905 (0.1658)c  0.2905 (0.0110)a  0.2682 (0.2026)  
North Dakota  0.5098 (0.1772)a  0.5098 (0.0112)a  0.6835 (0.1973)a  0.0844 (0.1305)  0.0844 (0.0111)a  0.0069 (0.1513)  0.4364 (0.2406)c  0.4364 (0.0293)a  0.8632 (0.2241)a 
Ohio  -0.0762 (0.1047) -0.0762 (0.0111)a -0.0512 (0.1049)  0.0552 (0.1002)  0.0552 (0.0045)a  0.0621 (0.1015)  0.2190 (0.2161)  0.2190 (0.0102)a  0.2317 (0.2190) 
Oklahoma  -0.1433 (0.0858)c -0.1433 (0.0148)a -0.1056 (0.0859)  0.1124 (0.0802)  0.1124 (0.0097)a  0.1192 (0.0826) -0.2395 (0.2164) -0.2395 (0.0171)a -0.2504 (0.2230)  
Pennsylvania -0.0722 (0.0926) -0.0722 (0.0046)a -0.0729 (0.0925) -0.2894 (0.1356)b -0.2894 (0.0105)a -0.2877 (0.1359)  0.1728 (0.3373)  0.1728 (0.0314)a  0.1829 (0.3367)  
South Carolina -0.0651 (0.3950) -0.0651 (0.0100)a -0.1697 (0.3516)  0.1028 (0.4210)  0.1028 (0.0182)a  0.0355 (0.3962) -0.1874 (0.5102) -0.1874 (0.0196)a -0.2592 (0.4834)  
South Dakota  0.0224 (0.0995)  0.0224 (0.0122)c  0.0191 (0.1009)  0.0217 (0.0705)  0.0217 (0.0060)a  0.0185 (0.0715) -0.1549 (0.1672) -0.1549 (0.0154)a -0.1697 (0.1693) 
Tennessee   0.3037 (0.1073)a  0.3037 (0.0125)a  0.2818 (0.1180)b  0.1126 (0.0953)  0.1126 (0.0141)a  0.0832 (0.1046) -0.4127 (0.2956) -0.4127 (0.0194)a -0.3183 (0.3242) 
Texas   0.0899 (0.0551)  0.0899 (0.0082)a  0.1402 (0.0575)b -0.0054 (0.0423) -0.0054 (0.0083) -0.0419 (0.0441) -0.0295 (0.1200) -0.0295 (0.0211) -0.0331 (0.1270)  
Virginia   0.0397 (0.1063)  0.0397 (0.0711)  0.1585 (0.1202) -0.2021 (0.0923)b -0.2021 (0.0048)a -0.2007 (0.1082)b  0.0121 (0.2363)  0.0121 (0.0229)  0.0617 (0.2767) 
Washington  0.2547 (0.3233)  0.2547 (0.0093)a -0.0507 (0.4659)  0.7953 (0.8042)  0.7953 (0.0086)a  0.3685 (0.9599) -0.6752 (0.6909) -0.6752 (0.0334)a  0.1019 (0.9390)  
West Virginia  0.0747 (0.1321)  0.0747 (0.0076)a  0.1688 (0.1632)  0.0943 (0.1278)  0.0943 (0.0082)a -0.0228 (0.1556)  0.0980 (0.2026)  0.0980 (0.0073)a  0.3967 (0.2318)c  
Wisconsin   0.0192 (0.0813)  0.0192 (0.0064)a  0.0213 (0.0813) -0.0094 (0.0992) -0.0094 (0.0058) -0.0209 (0.0986) -0.0401 (0.2274) -0.0401 (0.0318) -0.0177 (0.2266)  
 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
 
a
 Significant at 1% level. 
b
 Significant at 5% level. 
c
 Significant at 10% level. 
